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Working with Montgomery
On Being a Scientific Adviser
to a Commander-in-Chief
(21 Army Group 1944-1945)
B.F.J. Schonland
Operational Research scientists played animportant role in the Royal Air Force and
Royal Navy but the army resisted efforts to
employ civilian scientists until Sir John
Cockcroft, one of Britain’s leading scientists,
persuaded Lieutenant-Colonel B.F.G.
Schonland to take charge of an Army
Operational Research Group with the Ministry
of Supply. Cockcroft counted on Schonland to
overcome the army’s opposition to OR.
Basil Schonland was an inspired choice. A
graduate of the Rhodes University College and
Cambridge University, he had served with the
Royal Engineers on the Western Front 1915-
1918 and was twice mentioned-in-dispatches
for bravery. By 1917 he commanded eight
wireless stations, and when the war ended he
was serving as a Chief Instructor, Wireless
Communications. In 1919 Schonland went back
to Cambridge, spending four years at the
Cavendish Laboratory before returning to
South Africa where he established an
international reputation for his studies of
thunderstorms and lightning. Schonland had
been one of the early investigators of cathode
rays and the South African government invited
him to take charge of the development and
application of RDF for the South African armed
forces. His team built their own radar sets for
installation on the coast. This equipment was
also used in the air defence of East Africa and
the Middle East. Schonland was attached to
General Wavell’s headquarters in 1940 as RDF
advisor. In early 1941 he was sent to Britain to
examine developments in radar and purchase
equipment on behalf of his government.
Schonland’s military background and
scientific reputation were essential
qualifications for his new job, but it was his
personality that mattered most. Those who
worked with Schonland invariably describe his
ability to gain the confidence of senior and
junior officers and of civilians and other ranks.
He spoke with quiet authority but always
encouraged his subordinates to speak frankly
and to develop their own initiatives. According
to D.K. Hill, who worked closely with him,
Schonland was a good research scientist who
was interested in issues beyond his own field.
He got on well with army officers, stayed above
political and department intrigues, and learned
to suffer fools gladly while maintaining his
purpose. Such men were rare indeed and army
OR was very fortunate to obtain Schonland.
When No.2 Operational Research Section
was formed to serve with 21 Army Group
Schonland’s deputy, the Canadian scientist
O.M. Solandt, took over the Army Operational
Research Group and Schonland joined
Montgomery’s staff as his scientific advisor.
Schonland was given the rank of brigadier
which, at least theoretically, placed him on an
equal footing with the heads of Monty’s
intelligence and operations sections. He found
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Some years ago Sir John Cockcroft suggestedto me that I should put on paper something
about my experiences as Scientific Adviser (SA)
to Field Marshal Montgomery and some ideas
drawn from this experience. For various reasons
I did nothing about it, principally from the feeling
that I had not much to say which would not be
known to the Army Operational Research Group
(AORG) and the Scientific Adviser to the Army
Council, but also because without the war diaries
of the SA’s section and the Operational Research
Section (ORS) of 21 Army Group to refresh my
mind I could not write a proper account of all
that happened. However, it seems to me that
something in the nature of what the Army might
call the “doctrine” of the use of a scientific adviser
might now be worth putting on paper. So I here
lay down certain principles and illustrate them
from my experience with 21 Army Group. Others
may object to some of these principles and they
may, in any case, be out of date, but at least they
are here to be seen by, and perhaps amuse,
anyone who has to fill such a post in the future.
(1) The Scientific Adviser should have had
previous military service, preferably in a
campaign.
Such service could perhaps best have been
with an ORS in the field in a previous war. But
without military service the SA would be very
much at a loss on the field, wouldn’t know what
to do in an emergency and in general would be
simply a dressed-up civilian. The alternative,
which was tried in the North Africa Campaign,
of attaching an experienced staff officer to the
SA as a sort of bear-leader, does not work. No
one can work closely with a busy Army Group
staff through an “interpreter.” The SA’ s nickname
in the Mess will probably always be “The
Professor,” but it should be a term of affection
invented by his friends and not a form of
sarcastic wit.
(2) The SA must be a member of the Main
Headquarters staff.
An Army Group in the field has three
headquarters; Tactical, Main and Rear. The Chief
of Staff is for much of his time at Main HQ which
is restricted to the essential administrative,
operational and planning staff of the General
Officer Commanding (GOC), plus a few necessary
specialists. The Rear HQ consists of the big
administrative sections of the Army Group
including the Medical, Transport, Supplies,
Printing, Pay, Labour and Civil Affairs branches.
If the SA is not at Main HQ, he will know little or
nothing of what is going on operationally and
will be quite valueless.
When Main HQ of 21 Army Group moved to
its first “battle” position near Portsmouth and
left Rear HQ in London, I found myself with Rear
HQ. Fortunately an appeal to the Chief of Staff
by me was successful in getting me moved to
Main HQ. From time to time in the advance it
was clear that the Chief of Staff was anxious to
cut down the size of his Main HQ as much as he
could. He made some of his sections either move
back to Rear HQ or cut their staffs drastically.
In my case, however, he said I was very useful at
that “Freddie,” Lieutenant-General Frederic de
Guingand, Montgomery’s chief of staff, was
“kind, courteous and accessible.” His fellow
brigadiers had been told that he was there “to
solve difficult problems for them” and they
seemed quite willing to try him out. In a 1951
memoir Schonland noted that the “solving of
conundrums” was an important subsidiary
function of the Scientific Advisor. Most of the
puzzles were deadly serious and technically
complex. Others were more easily solved. When
intelligence officers asked whether the enemy
could “electrify the sea” by running leads from
local power stations into the ocean at the
landing beaches he assured them that this was
impossible.
For Schonland the principal function of the
Scientific Advisor was to promote the
application of operational research to the
battlefield and to ensure that the
recommendations of the OR teams were acted
upon. Those charged with commanding
operations today might well consider
Schonland’s advice.
In the following narrative, written in
February 1951, Schonland details his
experiences as the Scientific Advisor to Field
Marshal Montgomery in Northwest Europe and
shares the lessons and principles he learned
during that period.
Terry Copp, Wilfrid Laurier University
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Main HQ and was very lightly
staffed and need not worry.
Which brings me to point 3.
(3) In the initial stages of a
campaign the staff attached to
the Scientific Adviser should
be reduced to the absolute
minimum.
At the start of a campaign a
single extra fighting man or load
of shells or vehicle is more
valuable than a dozen extra
administrative or advisory staff
officers. All GOCs issue the most
stringent orders cutting down
the number of ‘extras’ who shall
be transported early to the
lodgement area. The placing of
a SA at the Army Group’s Main
HQ thus depends upon his
having with him a minimum of
staff. This has also a good
psychological effect in showing
that he is not “building an
empire.” He can always get more
experts later if he wants them,
permanently or on visits, when
transport is easy.
I had not been long at 21
Army Group when I was asked
what I wanted in the way of an
Establishment Table for my
section. Following the lines of
other Brigadiers it was expected
that I should have a General
Staff Officer (GSO) 1 and perhaps two GSO 2s
and a few clerks. I rather surprised them by
insisting that I wanted nothing more than one
GSO 2 (Major Hill), one clerk and a driver.
Much later on the Chief of Staff himself told me
that if I wanted more staff he had no objection. I
had no wish to increase my own staff, but saw
that the ORS got what it wanted.
(4) The Scientific Adviser should not exercise
direct command over the Operational
Research Section with the Army Group.
I came to 21 Army Group rather late and
the ORS under Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick
Johnson was already there, operating under the
direct command of the Brigadier General Staff,
Staff Duties (BGS (SD)). One of the functions of
the BGS (SD) is to deal with training and
equipment policy, with priorities in the supply
of equipment, with requirements for new
equipment and with reporting on the
performance of equipment in the field and the
training of troops in the use of weapons. These
are some of the things that an ORS studies, and
for it to have made its reports to the SA would
have led to confusion and difficulty with BGS
(SD). It was, however, necessary for the SA to
exercise close indirect control over the ORS,
advising the BGS (SD) as to what it should do
and whether it was doing its job correctly and
what changes were necessary in its staff. The
ORS staff are scientific men and they need to be
Brigadier Basil F.J. Schonland
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watched over and helped by someone who is not
a regular soldier but himself a scientist.
This arrangement sounds difficult, but in
practice it worked very well. One of the things a
SA must ensure is that the BGS (SD) leaves the
ORS a good deal to its own devices and yet is
ready to help it when help is needed. For
instance, the ORS may wish to study a battle or
a section of an operation and may need to be
accredited to and kindly received by the Army
or Corps concerned. Here the BGS (SD), who is
a very powerful man, can help considerably,
much more than any SA, since he has almost
daily personal contact with the forward units
concerned and they trust him. In the
introduction to “Operational Research in
Northwest Europe”, an account of the work of
No.2 ORS with 21st Army Group, it is stated:
The section came under the Brigadier Staff
Duties and not the Scientific Adviser. Only one
concession was made; that the Scientific Adviser
should control us in Air matters; in everything
else his influence was indirect and unofficial.
Throughout, indeed, we benefited
from a none too precise definition
of our functions and rights. As a
result we were allowed complete
freedom as to where we went,
what units we visited, how we
worked and how we finally
presented our results. Whether
this freedom was the outcome of
an intelligent appreciation from
above, that a set of
independently-minded men
would only work well in such an
atmosphere, or whether it was
merely an oversight of the military
machine, we never knew; our
freedom at any rate was not
shared by various other odd units
appended to the Army Group.1
This puts the position fairly
well. I should add that the
freedom given the ORS was no
oversight but deliberately
arranged between myself and
Brigadier Herbert, on my
undertaking to see that it was
not abused. It was actually not
quite so complete as the writer
suggests.
My personal control of the
ORS in Air matters was not a
“concession” but a sensible
arrangement. An ORS should be
vitally concerned with air
co-operation and support
bombing and the dropping of
men and supplies, because
these borderlines between two
Major John Fairlie, Royal Canadian
Artillery, was one of the operational
research scientists assigned to No.2
Operational Research Section, 21st
Army Group.
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services are usually
inadequately developed and
trained for before operations
start and in any case are very
dependent for their
effectiveness upon terrain.
But the BGS (SD) is not
really concerned with them
and it is best for the ORS to
be directed by the SA in this
field.
I have discussed this
point at some length because
I once met a Staff Officer
from India who read the
paragraph quoted above to imply that I had been
wrong in not taking direct command of the ORS,
or trying to do so. I can only say that under
similar circumstances I would follow the same
policy.
The fine work of No.2 ORS needs no mention
here; its reports are its justification. Most of the
projects which it undertook came as instructions
from the Chief of Staff either as his own idea or
at my suggestion. Others came from the ORS
itself or from BGS (SD).
The rise in the reputation of the ORS with
21 Army Group came, I think, not from excellent
reports on certain technical matters but from
the objectivity, accuracy and wisdom of its
reports on operations. All army staffs expect that
scientists should know technical things like
radar and gunnery and telecommunications. But
it came as a surprise to the 21 Army Group staff
that the ORS could render valuable reports on
operations.
My recollection is that arrangements for
reporting on operations in the early battles in
Normandy were made by the C-in-C with the
Director of Military Training at the War Office,
who supplied officers from the training
establishments in Great Britain for this purpose.
Their reports were circulated for comment
amongst the Main HQ staff and as far as I
remember, comment was so unfavourable that
the scheme was dropped. No.2 ORS was soon
after encouraged by the Chief of Staff to do more
of this type of work itself, and the collected
reports quoted above show how successful they
were.
It is a great regret to me that I was not able
to start them as battle-reporters much earlier.
But I arrived at 21 Army Group HQ only two
months before operations began, and it took
some considerable time after Overlord had
started to get the “feel” of the situation and of
the possibilities of the ORS in a fluid battle.
Moreover the staff had to be convinced that the
ORS was not just a “frill.”
(5) The Scientific Adviser should be appointed
as early as possible in the planning stage of a
Campaign.
Planning for Overlord by COSSAC [Chief of
Staff, Supreme Allied Command] was in full force
all through 1943. 21 Army Group under General
Paget was in existence before 1944 and General
Montgomery took command and started
preparing the final and altered plans for the
assault in January 1944. When I joined his HQ
early in April everything was already cut and
dried and it was not until mid-April that I was
given details of Overlord. It was then too late to
be of much direct assistance in the assault except
in the one important matter of the study of the
effect of the contemplated bombing of the
beaches of Normandy before the assault. This
study was carried out by Major Hill, my GS0 2,
and myself on an East coast beach, using
American bombers and various types of fuses
Major David Hill, Brigadier
Schonland’s GSO 2.
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and sizes of bombs. I think it was of considerable
value in deciding how far to use bombers in this
role and in assessing the effect of bombing on
movement of vehicles on the beaches. To the
problems raised by beach-obstacles the
Engineer-in-Chief, General Ingles, had already
been devoting many months before my arrival
and had obtained much help from the Scientific
Adviser to Combined Operations HQ, Professor
Bernal. I did what I could but came too late to
be of much help in this field.
Had it been possible for me to join the HQ
much earlier I could, I think, have been of greater
assistance. The SA should be associated with
the earliest stages of all planning and so be in a
position to suggest points on which further
information or trials are required. It was, for
instance, only after the landings had taken place
that the problem arose of finding in what woods
enemy panzer divisions had leaguered for the
night. A hasty experiment using MAD [Magnetic
Anomoly Detection] and centimetric radar was
laid on at our request in the USA but we got no
satisfactory answer to the problem in time.
Similarly, after the landings the army had to
improvise radar detection of enemy
trench-mortar positions with field GL [Gun
Laying] equipment in order to subdue this major
source of casualties round Caen.
Again, it was during the build-up period itself
that the problem of providing DUKWs
[amphibious trucks] with some means of finding
anchored transports and off-loading points at
night without lights was put to me. It was too
late to introduce suitable infra-red devices but
they would have worked had there been enough
time for development and training.
Other questions which might perhaps have
been considered in the planning stage and been
given effective trial and training effort were
interdiction of enemy traffic by nights along
roads in general and particularly Seine bridges
and pontoons, using infra-red or radar detection,
and the many problems of air co-operation,
including such things as better detection of
dummy guns on air photographs and pin-point
bombing by the aid of GL Radar.
These examples are all technical ones. I think
also the SA could be of use in the planning stage
on some tactical points, especially when these
are of an inter-service nature. Which brings me
to:-
(6) The Scientic Adviser should be in a
position to advise on inter-service problems,
particularly air problems.
The Air Arm has its own complex doctrine
of warfare with much of which the Army has
nothing to do. But when the Air co-operates with
the Army the results of its actions, close-support
bombing, interdiction of traffic or dropping men
or supplies, are shown on the ground and it is
an important question as to who is to study these
operations to learn from them how to do better.
The Army is vitally concerned; the Army
Commander wants to know what fuses the
bombs are going to carry so that he can tell what
effect on the terrain and on the enemy is going
to follow support bombing. He wants to know
what accuracy can be expected of this bombing
so as to place his troops in safety and what can
go wrong with ground signals to the bombers.
And he wants to know afterwards what effect it
has had on the enemy and on the “going” of his
own vehicles.
For this and a great deal of other air
information he must be able to turn to his own
advisers. I was fortunate in having Major Hill
with me, whom I had previously sent to Army
Co-operation Command as an attached member
of their ORS, and we dealt with a good deal of
this sort of thing. The Scientific Advisers to the
Air Force didn’t take kindly to our activities and
were at first distinctly unco-operative, but we
continued and got more help from them later
on.
(7) The chief function of a Scientific Adviser
is to see that the recommendations in the
reports of the ORS are acted upon.
It used to be said, with some measure of truth,
that the lessons learned during a campaign were
only applied in the next war. For this there is
some justification since the soldier is trained to
fight in a certain way and given certain weapons
with which to fight. To train him differently and
to supply him with different weapons takes a
long time. One of the uses of operational research
is to study troops and their weapons minutely,
including those of the enemy, so as to be able to
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foresee difficulties which will
arise in battle and to advise
on changes. But in fact,
many of the difficulties
which are feared never
eventuate and quite new
ones occur which could not
have been foreseen. The
chief use of operational
research is to study what
happens in an operation and
to advise on changes in the
tactics of future operations.
The fighting soldiers and their commanders
are of course well aware of this need and a great
deal of immediate consultation and study of
tactics takes place after an operation. The ORS
has, however, got both the time and the training
to make an objective study, both things which
the soldier lacks, and can devote itself to
replacing opinion by deduction from observed
facts.
On this business of application of the lessons
learned from operational research, the report
quoted previously on the work of No.2 ORS with
21 Army Group ends on an unnecessarily gloomy
note:-
Many of the ideas that emerged from our reports
were never adopted, often never even considered,
because they were only ideas buried in reports
that were never read. The conclusion that must
follow from this, is that the investigating body,
the ORS, can be lowly-ranked, but that it needs
a highly-ranked officer, a Scientific Adviser, to
see that its ideas are tried out. Brigadier
Schonland, who could have fulfilled this function
for us, left just at the point when we had
sufficiently developed our technique to be able
to give him valuable information.2
It should be said, however, that many of the
ideas emerging from the ORS reports were
adopted. Some, at least, were read and
appreciated at very high levels indeed. The
campaign in Western Europe ended only a few
months after the ORS had really got into its stride
and it takes much time and work on the part of
an SA to get busy commanders to consider and
introduce changes in tactics. The great thing that
No.2 ORS did was to show that an operational
research section and a Scientific Adviser have
as their first duty the rapid application of lessons
learned from operations and that they are able
to derive such lessons in a form which will carry
conviction. Every C-in-C and his Chief of Staff
in a future campaign should be given a copy of
“Operational Research in North-West Europe” so
that the SA and the ORS have not got to convince
them of the value of operational research before
help and facilities on a sufficient scale are
provided.
(8) A subsidiary but important function of a
Scientific Adviser is the solving of
“conundrums.”
The staff from time to time have what I call
“conundrums” which they put to the SA and
whose solution is of value to them. Of the dozens
of such puzzles put to me I remember the few
quoted below.
(a) What will be the accuracy of
radar-controlled (Wurzburg) fire by
enemy coastal guns in darkness, smoke
or fog, against our supporting naval
vessels? What can be done to reduce this
accuracy? (The solution of this, with the
help of AORG was easy.)
Two operational research
scientists, Pat Townend and John
Young, pose for a photo at the
Headquarters of 21 Army Group
near Süchteln, Germany, April
1945.
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(b) It is reported that the enemy has
installed leads from local power-stations
with which to electrify the sea. As this
would affect morale if it can’t be said to
be impossible, what are the possibilities?
(Answer, after consulting a distinguished
physiologist and doing an elementary
calculation, impossible.) Intelligence put
up quite a number of questions of this
nature.
(c) If the bombing of beaches is carried
out by x bombers of a certain type using
such and such bombs, what is the
probability that any direct track followed
by a tank will find a bomb-hole in the
way? (Maximum probability easily found
from calculations of bomb-spread and
diameters of holes.) This question had
several variants and involved the general
problem of the use of bombers in
advance of a tank attack, including, of
course, the extent of the danger-zone.
(d) If we knew of a panzer leaguer and
turned Bomber Command onto it, what
damage would result to both hard- and
soft- skinned vehicles?
(e) The C-in-C’s Tactical HQ has its W/T
[Wireless Transmission] station
half-a-mile (?) away; with what accuracy
can the enemy locate it by
direction-finding [DF] and thus locate the
HQ itself? (Similar questions turned up
about the location of forward W/T
stations by DF methods since it was
wrongly thought that the fire they
experienced was due to enemy
direction-finding.)
(f) When we have reached the Dutch
frontier, what areas of southern England
can the enemy reach by V2 bombardment
and what area of Holland would have to
be captured to eliminate the use of this
weapon against England altogether?
(Answer given immediately; proved
correct later.)
(g) When the port of Antwerp is fully
opened, what monthly damage can the
enemy do to the shipping in it by V1 and
V2 bombardment, using his maximum
effort? (This question took a lot of
answering; I forget the exact answer, but
it was a large fraction of the shipping.
Nothing at all like the calculated
maximum loss ever took place.)
(h) Does the accuracy of V2 fire against
Lille suggest that it is directed by an
enemy agent in the city? (Answer, Yes;
agent was found.)
(i) If the A.A. round Brussels uses
proximity fuses against V1’s without a
device to make them ineffective before
they approach the ground, what will be
the casualties in people, houses and farm
animals? (Pretty dreadful it turned out
to be.)
(9) The Scientific Adviser should have the
rank of brigadier.
Main HQ consisted of four major-generals
and about fifteen brigadiers, with their staffs.
The principal direct advisers to the C-in-C and
Chief of Staff were BGS (Intelligence),  BGS
(Operations), BGS (SD) and BGS (Plans). It
would have been difficult for the SA to be on
easy terms with these last four if he had himself
been a major-general. Unless the arrangements
in a future HQ are different, I do not think he
should rank higher than a brigadier. On the other
hand, a lower rank than brigadier would make
his work almost impossible. He must eat in the
Brigadiers’ Mess and get to know his fellow
brigadiers extremely well. Until he ceases to be
greeted with polite reserve when he calls on them
about something, until, in fact, they reach the
stage of calling him by his Christian name or
nickname, he is not in a position to do his job
properly.
(10) Relations with the SA to the Army
Council.
A military commander entrusted with a task
in the field requires absolute loyalty from every
member of his staff, and there is not the slightest
possibility of the SA to an Army Group passing
information, other than purely technical
information, back to the SA at the War Office if
it has anything to do with the operations of his
Commander, unless and until it has received the
commander’s approval. In practice reports of
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this nature may be held up
for a considerable time for
the Commander and his
Chief of Staff are very busy
people. The Army Group
staff work as a closely-knit
team and any suggestion
that an ORS report or one
from the SA should go
quickly back to the War
Office as a comment on
operations, whether
scientific or not, without the approval of the Chief
of Staff, would simply mean that the ORS and
the SA would go back too. The SA to the Army
Group has therefore to exercise tact and
discretion in his relations with the SA at the War
Office, who, if he is not familiar with the extreme
“closeness” of the staff of a Commander in the
field, may not understand. The fundamental
point is that the SA and the ORS are there to
serve the Commander and no one else. They are
not there to provide material for a current history
of operations unless the Commander himself so
instructs.
Actually, by agreement with the Chief of Staff,
a certain amount of technical and DO
information can be passed back but it must be
realised that at times the SA and his staff are
themselves working very hard and keeping very
long hours and do not find unofficial liaison very
easy.
This concentration of attention on the needs
of the Command he serves means also that it is
not the primary function of the SA to make a
study of special enemy weapons and methods
such as the V1 and V2 and other V monstrosities
we overran in France. Unless this study is to be
of use in future operations it is best left to teams
sent out by the War Office to the rear areas. If
the SA has time for military archaeology he is
unlikely to be doing enough proper work for his
Commander.
(11) Bright-Idea Men.
The SA himself need not be, perhaps should
not be, a particularly original scientist. A very
original man is carried away by his enthusiasms
and only one in ten of his ideas is any use. With
the remaining nine he will be a nuisance to
everyone concerned at a time and in an area
where nuisances cannot be tolerated.
The main job of the SA in this regard should
be to see where problems exist and to get them
solved, preferably at home or, if not, by the ORS.
It should, however, be clear to all the Army Group
staff that the SA can really produce from home
the brightest man available in any particular field
whatever as soon as they express a wish to have
such a person. And arrangements must be made
in advance for him to do this quickly. With the
assistance of the Scientific Adviser to the Army
Council and of the Ministry of Supply, I was able
to bring over in this way several specialists from
England once we had secured a proper
lodgement and they did first-class work. Much
more of this will be needed in any future war
and the SA is the correct channel for such visits.
Conversely, the SA has to protect the staff against
some bright-idea men. For instance, a few weeks
before D-Day an eminent scientist who had done
very valuable work in collecting information
about the beaches of Normandy approached me
with the suggestion that he should provide for
each commander of a battalion or tank unit a
Two members of the No.2
Operational Research Section
team examine bomb craters in the
village of Petite Launay on the
Risle River during their
investigation for a report  on
“Crater Bombing of River Lines in
Normandy.”
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booklet of detailed information about all the
villages and quarries and woods and so forth
which he would encounter as he fought his way
inland. This was not really a good idea at such a
late stage, if ever, and BGS (I) whom I consulted
advised me to have it suppressed. Infantry and
tank commanders have a great deal of fighting
to do and neither time nor staff to use more than
the usual detailed maps.
On another occasion I was prevailed upon
before D-Day to put up a scheme for clearing a
track through minefields by dropping a string
of small A/S bombs from a fairly low-flying
aircraft. I was unwise enough to work this out
in a presentable form and to get a high-level
conference called about it. The scheme was
excellent except that, as the AOC TAF [Air Officer
Commanding, Tactical Air Force] pointed out
with some heat, each bombed minefield would
almost certainly cost several airmen’s lives and
lose one or two aircraft. He quite rightly thought
minefields were the Army’s business.
(12) Relations with Armies and forward
formations.
As will be clear from the reports of No.2 ORS,
most of their work was done with 2nd Army and
Canadian Army and some with tank divisions
and other forward formations. It is a matter of
regret to me that I myself never developed proper
liaison with the Commanders and Staffs of
forward formations. This was principally
because they were fighting very hard all the time
I was with 21 Army Group (I left in November,
1944) and owing to my late posting to the Group
in England I had no easy opportunity of getting
to know them.
Now that Operational Research has shown
its value in the field, it would be easier to make
these contacts and I believe them to be very
important. The need for them emphasises the
point that an SA should be appointed at the
earliest possible moment in the planning stage
and not just before battle starts.
(13) The Chief of Staff.
In spite of his title, the SA will find that he
sees the Army Group Commander extremely
rarely. For if the Commander is a man like Field
Marshal Montgomery, the staff focuses its advice
on to the Chief or Staff who, in the person of
General de Guingand, took full responsibility for
action which had to follow. The SA is therefore
really Scientific Adviser to the Chief of Staff and
any future SA will indeed be fortunate if he gets
from his Chief of Staff the measure of friendship,
support, interest and insight which I was
privileged to receive from de Guingand.
(14) Is a Scientific Adviser a necessary part
of an Army Group Staff?
The answer to this is bound up with the ORS,
with the need for its recommendations to be
considered on a high level, with the conundrum
job and with the need for the introduction of
specialists. I think it is important to have an SA
with the Army Group unless the head of the ORS
is himself of the standing to be a Brigadier. If he
is, an argument exists for making him SA as well.
But the difficulty mentioned earlier on that he
then interferes with the responsibilities of BGS
(SD) and perhaps others to a lesser degree still
remains. When I was recalled from 21 Army
Group by General Smuts, the Chief of Staff on
my advice solved this problem by creating
Colonel Johnson the de facto Scientific Adviser
without giving him such a title, while keeping
him under BGS (SD)’s command. The last
paragraph of the report quoted above suggests
that this solution was not entirely successful.
In any future war the general, scientific and
conundrum responsibilities of the SA will be
considerably greater than they were in the last
and in my opinion he will be much needed.
Notes
1. The report “Operational Research in Northwest Europe”
has been republished by the Laurier Centre for Military
Strategic and Disarmament Studies as, Montgomery’s
Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest Europe,
The Work of No.2 Operational Research Section with
21 Army Group June 1944 to July 1945, Terry Copp,
editor, (Waterloo: LCMSDS, 2000), p.50.
2. Montgomery’s Scientists, p.53.
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